Saudi Arabia is preparing to grant the International Atomic Energy Agency enhanced verification powers that approach the standards of the Additional Protocol, even though the formal bilateral atomic agreement signed with the United States in July does not mandate signing the protocol itself. IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi disclosed the diplomatic development during a press conference in Vienna on Monday, noting that ongoing consultations have successfully integrated stringent oversight provisions directly into the upcoming bilateral framework.
The discussions surrounding the civil nuclear cooperation pact have drawn intense scrutiny from non-proliferation organizations, including the Arms Control Association, which previously criticized the pact for omitting the Additional Protocol. That protocol typically grants the United Nations nuclear watchdog sweeping authority, such as conducting snap inspections at undeclared facilities. While Grossi acknowledged that formal adoption of the Additional Protocol remains the ideal verification setup, he emphasized that Riyadh is positioning itself to exceed core obligations under its existing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.
The planned bilateral oversight arrangement focuses heavily on sensitive industrial operations within the nuclear fuel cycle that possess significant proliferation implications. Grossi specified that the additional verification and monitoring authorizations would directly target uranium enrichment, the preceding conversion stage, and nuclear fuel reprocessing. These specific industrial processes allow for the separation of plutonium from spent reactor fuel and require rigorous international oversight to ensure materials remain dedicated entirely to peaceful civilian power generation.
By securing specialized authorizations for these sensitive domains, the agency aims to bridge the gap left by the absence of the formal Additional Protocol. Grossi stated during his briefing that the capacities and monitoring authorizations being negotiated for these specific activities are very similar to those found under standard additional protocols, though he did not elaborate on the precise technical parameters. Once the final text is consolidated, the bilateral agreement between the agency and the kingdom will be submitted to the IAEA's 35-nation Board of Governors for formal review.
Grossi's announcement regarding Saudi Arabia coincided with broader IAEA updates concerning regional nuclear safeguards, most notably a historic breakthrough regarding Syria's clandestine atomic infrastructure. The IAEA confirmed in a report to member states that the unfinished reactor in Syria's eastern province of Deir al-Zor—destroyed by Israeli airstrikes in 2007—was specifically designed for the efficient production of weapons-usable fissile material. The agency's recent investigations uncovered approximately 73 metric tons of natural uranium metal, primarily structured as reactor fuel that should have been officially declared to international monitors under the former Assad regime.
Following the ouster of President Bashar al-Assad in late 2024, Syria's new authorities engaged in active cooperation with the agency, granting inspectors the necessary access to resolve outstanding historical safeguards questions. Grossi praised this administrative transition as a significant step forward for regional nuclear transparency. Contrasting the cooperative posture of Syria's current administration with the opacity of past decades, the IAEA chief underscored the critical importance of robust verification mechanisms across the Middle East as nations pursue civil nuclear capabilities under international supervision.
